Princeton University Exposes Diebold Flaws
| This is a video by the Information Technology group at Princeton University demonstrating how easy it is to manipulate electronic voting machines. Watch this, then ask your local Registrar of Voters, Election Commissioner, etc. what they think about it. Don't take "You have to trust us" as an answer. Don't take "But we have laws against tampering with election equipment" as an answer. Come on, we have laws against robbery but probably every convenience store in the country has been robbed some time. Election officials often send these vulnerable machines home with poll workers before the election, where they sit in homes, garages, cars, and even carports. All it takes is one crook to find one machine and install a virus that spreads between voting machines just like any other Windows virus. So on to the official talking points from Princeton: Main Findings The main findings of our study are: 1. Malicious software running on a single voting machine can steal votes with little if any risk of detection. The malicious software can modify all of the records, audit logs, and counters kept by the voting machine, so that even careful forensic examination of these records will find nothing amiss. We have constructed demonstration software that carries out this vote-stealing attack. 2. Anyone who has physical access to a voting machine, or to a memory card that will later be inserted into a machine, can install said malicious software using a simple method that takes as little as one minute. In practice, poll workers and others often have unsupervised access to the machines. 3. AccuVote-TS machines are susceptible to voting-machine viruse! s - computer viruses that can spread malicious software automatically and invisibly from machine to machine during normal pre- ! and post-election activity. We have constructed a demonstration virus that spreads in this way, installing our demonstration vote-stealing program on every machine it infects. 4. While some of these problems can be eliminated by improving Diebold's software, others cannot be remedied without replacing the machines' hardware. Changes to election procedures would also be required to ensure security. | |


